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ABSTRACT

Deep learning systems have achieved great success in various types of applications in recent years.
They are increasingly being adopted for safety-critical tasks such as face recognition, surveillance
systems, speech recognition, and autonomous driving. On the other hand, it has been found that
deep neural networks (DNNs) can easily be fooled by adversarial input samples. These imperceptible perturbations on images can lead any machine learning system to misclassify the objects
with high confidence. Furthermore, they can be almost indistinguishable to a human observer.
These systems can also be exposed to adverse weather conditions such as fog, rain, and snow.
This vulnerability raises major concerns in security-sensitive environments. Therefore, vulnerability of deep learning systems to synthetic adversarial attacks has been extensively studied and
demonstrated, but the impact of natural weather conditions on these systems has not been studied
in detail.
The main contribution of this thesis is exploring the effects of fog on classification accuracy of
the popular Inception deep learning model. We use stereo images from the Cityscapes dataset
and computer graphics techniques to mimic realistic naturally occurring fog. We show that the
Inception deep learning model is vulnerable to the addition of fog in images.
We also review the types of adversarial attacks and defenses, describe the state-of-the-art methods
for each group, and compare their results.
Adversarial images can be used to generate targeted attacks or non-targeted attacks. Targeted attacks misguide the deep learning networks to produce responses from a specific a priori determined
class. In non-targeted attacks, all images in the dataset are not assigned to a specific class; instead,
the output of the deep neural network is arbitrarily wrong. In this thesis, we create non-targeted,
iterative, and physical attacks.
iii
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Deep learning algorithms demonstrate great achievements in various pattern recognition applications and image classification problems. With recent advancements in high-performance graphical
processing units and the availability of a large number of classified images, deep learning networks
have become even better at image recognition tasks than an average human being.
Despite these outstanding success stories, it has been repeatedly shown that deep learning networks produce incorrect responses when the input is perturbed by small but intelligently crafted
“adversarial" changes. For example, such adversarial images can easily cause even state-of-the-art
deep learning networks to erroneously classify the images [6, 7, 8, 3]. In many cases, the modifications to the input images are so small that the original images are nearly indistinguishable
from the adversarial images to an average human eye. Adversarial inputs pose a real challenge
to the successful adoption of deep learning in safety-critical applications. Adversarial attacks on
deep learning networks can affect fingerprint and face recognition tasks, as well as cause errors in
speech recognition systems, and other applications.
Adversarial attacks can also be classified based on the number of times an input is analyzed during
the crafting of the adversarial input. One-time attacks utilize only a single access to the inputs to
create the adversarial images. Iterative attacks require multiple accesses to the input image as they
create and refine the adversarial images. Perturbations used to generate adversarial images can be
broadly classified as digital and physical. Digital attacks are based on modification of the input
image in the memory of a computer that may or may not correspond to an image in the real world,
while physical attacks are based on images that can be acquired from the physical world.

1

(a) Original image is correctly classified as a minivan by the Inception-v3 model.

(b) Image with fog is incorrectly classified as a fountain by the Inception-v3 model.

Figure 1.1: The addition of fog to an image causes the Inception-v3 model to incorrectly classify images
that would be correctly classified by a human user [1].

2

In this thesis, we create non-targeted, iterative, and physical attacks. Our experiments demonstrate
that the addition of synthetically generated fog to real-world images causes deep learning networks
to incorrectly classify images [1]. Unlike adversarial images, our inputs are not crafted maliciously
by choosing careful random perturbations. Instead, our inputs are merely generated using the
synthetic addition of fog; hence, such images can be expected to occur in the real world. We
present a small but essential step towards demonstrating the need to design much more robust
machine learning systems for safety-critical applications.
In addition, we demonstrate the solution models, experiments, and results on some of the types of
adversarial attacks and defenses in the literature [9]. Their contributions are significant on this era
of machine learning and DNNs.

3

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Adversarial Attacks and Defenses

The typical purpose of an adversarial attack is to add a natural perturbation (i.e. fast gradient sign,
fog, and sunlight etc.) on an image so that the target model misclassifies the sample, but it is still
correctly classified by the human eye. Three main types of studies in adversarial attacks have been
mainstream in this area:

• Non-targeted adversarial attacks are developed to fool a machine learning classifier by modifying source image. The neural network does not return a certain class as opposed to targeted attacks. The output can be a random class excluding the original one.
• Targeted adversarial attacks are designed to misclassify an image as a specified target class
by modifying source image. The output of this neural network is only one certain class.
Impersonation can be an example for this type of attacks because an adversarial image can
disguise a face as an admin user.
• Defenses against adversarial attacks are aimed to build such a robust classifier that it correctly identifies adversarial images.

Recent research studies on the generation of adversarial samples introduce some new methods. In
this thesis, the most well-known and state-of-the-art attacks and defenses are presented [9]:
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2.1.1

Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)

One practical way of generating adversarial examples was suggested by their linear behavior [10].
It is observed that the models that are linear are easy to be perturbed. Therefore, adversarial
training is processed in a fast and simple way with this method. The goal of fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) is to obtain a different classification result (i.e. GoogLeNet) from the original
one by adding an unnoticeably small vector. The elements of the vector are extracted by taking the
sign of the gradient of a loss function associated with that feature vector:

(2.1)

η =  sign(∇x J(θ, x, y)) .

Let J(θ, x, y) be the cost function for training a neural network, η be the perturbation, θ be the
parameters, x be the input, and y be the targets to the model. The cost function can be obtained as
linear which causes an optimal perturbation as in the equation 2.1. It was demonstrated that this
method reliably misclassifies the model inputs [10].
A gradient descent is an optimization function that can be used to find a local minimum for a
differentiable function. First of all, current adversarial samples are described for linear structures.
The individual input feature has limited precision in many cases; for instance, the digital images
with 8 bits per pixel can dismiss all the information below

1
255

of the dynamic range. Since there

is limited precision for any feature, it is not logical for the classifier to return a different class for
an input x from to an adversarial input x’= x + η, where η is the perturbation of each element less
than the precision of features. Technically, for the cases which result from well-separated outputs,
the classifier is expected to give the same output to x and x’ as long as kηk∞ < , where  is small
enough so that it can be dismissed by the sensor or data storage apparatus related to the case. Let
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a weight vector be w, an adversarial sample x, and consider the dot product between them:

(2.2)

wT x’ = wT x + wT η .

In the equation 2.2, the activation increases linearly by wT η due to the adversarial perturbation.
This demonstrates that a basic linear model can provide adversarial samples if there is enough
dimension of its inputs:
gt+1 = µ . gt +

J θ (x0 t ,y 0 )
k∇x J θ (x0 t ,y 0 )k1

,

(2.3)

x’t+1 = x’t - α . sign(gt+1 ) .
The gradient and adversarial samples are calculated in the given equation 2.3 according to the
FGSM with momentum, where y’ is the misclassified target class and α=/L with L being the total
number of iterations. The effectiveness is boosted by this method with using the momentum term
into the iterative process.

2.1.2

Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)

A multi-step variant of FGSM proposed by Madry et al. [4] projects gradient descent (PGD) on
the negative loss function, and it is a more powerful adversary than FGSM itself:

xt+1 = π x+S (xt + α sign(∇x J(θ, x, y))) .

(2.4)

In the equation 2.4, π is the projection of a point onto the set x+S; where x is a data point and S is
a set of allowed perturbations. FGSM does not increase robustness. More specifically, the network
might overfit to the adversarial examples generated by FGSM, which is called label leaking. These
networks do not demonstrate any robustness against PGD adversaries. Therefore, PGD was the
strongest attack using the local first-order information about the network [4]. Moreover, FGSM is

6

Table 2.1: Performance results [4] of the adversarially trained model against each adversaries for  = 0.3
using MNIST (A: the network itself - white-box attack).

Method
Natural
FGSM
PGD
PGD
PGD
PGD
Targeted
CW
CW+

Steps
40
100
40
100
40
40
40

Restarts
1
1
20
20
1
1
1

Source
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

Accuracy
98.8%
95.6%
93.2%
91.8%
90.4%
89.3%
92.7%
94.0%
93.9%

a one-step approach and there exists some shortcomings for this method. However, PGD is very
useful because it works very well for the large scale constrained optimization.
Generally, the PGD technique is restarted from many points in the l∞ balls around some data points
from a given evaluation set to explore a large part of the loss landscape. In the loss function of
model parameters, the value of all the local maxima is similar. These values are the same for both
type of networks; normal networks and adversarially-trained networks. Robustness against the
PGD adversary gives robustness against all the first-order adversaries, which means it is the attack
that would depend upon the first-order information only. When the gradients of the loss functions
are used in the case of adversary with regard to different input values, it is concluded that this
might not find any significantly better local maxima than PGD.
For the results demonstrated in the Table 2.1, a network consisted of a convolutional layer with 32
filters, one 2 x 2 max-pooling, another convolutional layer with 64 filters followed by another 2 x
2 max-pooling, and lastly one fully-connected layer of size 1024 was used. It was observed that
PGD was the best attack. As for the Table 2.2, ResNet and its ten times wider variant were used to
train the network and PGD was observed as the most effective attack.
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Table 2.2: Performance results [4] of the adversarially trained model against each adversaries for  = 8 using
CIFAR10 (A: the network itself - white-box attack).

Method
Natural
FGSM
PGD
PGD
CW
2.1.3

Steps
7
20
30

Source
A
A
A
A

Accuracy
87.3%
56.1%
50.0%
45.8%
46.8%

Basic Iterative Method (BIM)

Basic Iterative Method (BIM) is an iterative version of FGSM. In other words, adversarial noise
is iteratively applied multiple times instead of applying it only once [11]. Then, pixel values are
clipped after each step so that they are ensured to be in an -neighborhood of the clean data. The
number of iterations can be selected during the experiments:

Clipx,  (x’) = min(255, x+, max(0, x - , x’)) ,

(2.5)

In the equation 2.5, Clipx,  (x’) is a clipping value in each iteration limited by . Multiple iterations
are used to create the adversarial images:
x’0 = x ,

(2.6)

x’n+1 = Clipx,  (x’n + α sign(∇x J(x’n , y))) .
BIM was demonstrated to be more effective than the FGSM attack on ImageNet dataset. In addition, adversarial training can increase the robustness of neural networks for one-step attacks (e.g.,
FGSM) but might not work well under iterative attacks (e.g., BIM).
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2.1.4

Carlini-Wagner (CW)

Carlini-Wagner et al. (CW) introduced an approach that is able to overcome defensive distillation.
It presented three powerful attacks against this recent promising defense algorithm in [12]: L2
attack, L0 attack, and L∞ attack [2]. These three attacks demonstrated 100% success rate in finding
adversarial samples on defensively distilled and undistilled networks [2].
Defensive distillation was used to improve the robustness of an arbitrary neural network model
against adversarial samples. However, CW proposed L2 , L0 , and L∞ algorithms that generate
adversarial samples causing misclassification with the same label; therefore, they beat defensive
distillation with 100% probability. It is processed in four steps:

1. Train a neural network,
2. Calculate the softmax in a smoother way and compute the soft training labels by applying
the network to each case in the training data set,
3. Then, train the distilled network with soft training labels,
4. Lastly, the distilled network is tested on the new input to classify.

One of the main contributions that CW presented was that L0 attack was the first approach that
results in some specified misclassification on ImageNet. Secondly, after all these three attacks
were applied to defensive distillation, it was proved that there was little difference in security
between undistilled and distilled networks. L0 attack measures the distance based on the number
of pixels that have been changed while the L2 attack is used to measure the distance using the
RMS (Root Mean Square) between x and x’; where x is an input and x’ is a new input found that is
similar to x but classified as a targeted t. On the other hand, L∞ is used to measure the maximum
changes to any of the coordinates.
9

Figure 2.1: A demonstration of the attacks presented in [2] on a defensively distilled network. The leftmost
column represents the input image. The next three columns illustrate adversarial images created using L2 ,
L∞ , and L0 attacks presented by Carlini-Wagner et al. All the three misclassified examples have the same
misclassified label.
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It was observed that L2 attack has low distortion while L0 attack is non-differentiable and badsuited for gradient descent. In addition, L∞ is not fully differentiable and it is also seen that
gradient descent does not give good results.

2.1.5

Jacobian-based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA)

JSMA [3] iteratively perturbs features of input data that has large adversarial saliency scores. This
score describes the adversary by taking a sample away from its source class towards a certain target
class. All other methods use output variations to find related input perturbations for adversarial
samples, whereas JSMA constructs a mapping from input perturbations to output variations. This
is called forward derivative, a matrix defined as the Jacobian of the function learned by a DNN:

∇J(x) = ∂J(x) / ∂x = [∂Jj (x) / ∂xi ]i∈1..M,j∈1..N .

(2.7)

In the given formulation 2.7, x is the input image and J(x) is the classified result by the network
defined in [3]; where M is the input dimension or the number of neurons on input layer and N is the
output dimension or the number of neurons on output layer. This is the Jacobian of the function
regarding to what is learned by training the neural network. The smallest possible perturbation is
crafted to fool the neural network. Then, two adversarial saliency maps were introduced to manipulate pixels/features in each iteration. 97.10% success rate was achieved to create an adversarial
sample that can be misclassified with perturbing only 4.02% of the input features per image.
Generally, a saliency map is known as a visualization tool to explore adversarial examples. This
map symbolizes which input features should perturb to affect the changes in the network. As Papernot et al. described in [3], it is a repetitive method for targeted misclassification.
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Table 2.3: Results [3] of two average distortion values on three sets (10,000 samples): one considering all
images and second considering only successful images.

Original Samples
Training
Validation
Test

Adversary success
97.05%
97.19%
97.05%

Average distortion-1
4.45%
4.41%
4.45%

Average distortion-2
4.03%
4.01%
4.03%

In this classification method, the derivative of DNN is exploited and it tries to find the adversarial
perturbation that allows to misclassify the models into the required targets. Let us take the input y
and a neural network M; and, the output of the class i is noted by the M(y) for class i. Let us also
specify the required class p. M(y) for p would be increased while probabilities M(y) for class i of
all other classes that are not p will decrease until the maximum of M(y) is obtained. After defining
the adversarial saliency map for the input feature, the pair of features is considered to maximize
the saliency map between them and perturbs each feature by some constant offset. This process is
repeated until the target misclassification is reached.
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Figure 2.2: Adversarial image generation in [3]. Input images are distorted in order for the DNN to
misclassify them (min distortion = 0.26%, max distortion = 13.78%, and average distortion  = 4.06%).
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2.1.6

A Momentum-based Iterative FGSM (MI-FGSM) for Non-targeted and Targeted Attacks

The proposed method in this work [13] was aimed at non-targeted adversarial attack for classification task using ImageNet dataset.
This method was created by adding a momentum term to BIM in order to have more transferable
adversarial examples. While one-step methods (i.e. FGSM) can underfit the model, BIM can
overfit them; which are mostly untransferable across different models. In order to overcome these
problems, a momentum term is integrated into BIM to have more balanced update directions and
get rid of poor local optima. In conclusion, having stronger and more transferable attack is the
main advantage provided with this approach.
gt+1 = µ . gt +

J θ (x0 t ,y 0 )
k∇x J θ (x0 t ,y 0 )k1

,

x’t+1 = Clip[0,1] (x’t + α sign (gt+1 )) ,
P
f(x) = K
k=1 w k f k (x).

(2.8)

In the given formula 2.8, g0 = 0, x’0 = 0, α = /T, and T is the number of iterations, gt is the
gradients of t number of iterations, µ is the decay factor, x’t is the perturbed adversarial example.
In non-targeted attack, this algorithm was used for ensemble models; fk (x) is the k-th model, wk is
the ensemble weight. The attacked models are listed as follows:

• Normally trained models: Inception-v3 [14], Inception v4 [15], Inception ResNet v2 [15],
and ResNet v2-101 [16].
• An adversarially trained model: Inception-v3adv [11].
• Ensemble adversarially trained models: Inc-v3ens3 , Inc-v3ens4 , and IncRes-v2ens [17].

The formulation of momentum iterative targeted attack is slightly different from the one used for
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non-targeted attacks:
gt+1 = µ gt + (∇x J(f(x’t ), ytarget ) / std(∇x J(f(x’t ), ytarget ))) ,

(2.9)

x’t+1 = Clip[0,1] (x’t - αClip[-2,2] (round(gt+1 ))) .
In the equation 2.9, std(.) refers to the standard deviation and round(.) is rounding to the nearest
integer. Transferability is not considered in targeted attacks. The same models as in the nontargeted track are used for the targeted attacks.

2.1.7

An Iterative FGSM-based Approach for Non-targeted and Targeted Attacks

The proposed solution for non-targeted attack was inspired by the method which uses FGSM with
Random Perturbation (RAND+FGSM) [17]. The optimal perturbation is detected under a firstorder approximation after a random perturbation is added to an input. The reason why the random perturbation is used is because it skips the non-smooth vicinity of the data point. In [17],
RAND+FGSM has a high success rate in white-box setting. However, the transferability of perturbations has low rate. Therefore, a geometric transformation is applied in order to increase transferability. FGSM is a one-shot algorithm which means it only applies a single gradient computation.
One-shot attacks provide resiliency for adversarially trained models. However, those models are
vulnerable to the attacks which iteratively maximize their loss function. Iterative FGSM (I-FGSM)
iteratively applies FGSM k times. It computes multiple gradient updates and lowers error rates
more than FGSM. In conclusion, the presented approach in this project outperforms other one-shot
methods on all the trained models. The targeted attack has a similar approach with the non-targeted
attack as described above. The main differences are as follows:

• The loss function is minimized instead of maximizing.
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Table 2.4: The models and their success rate using the Iterative FGSM-based approach for non-targeted
attack [5].

Classifier
Success Rate
Inception-v3
96.74%
ResNet 50
92.78%
Inception ResNet v2
92.32%
Inception v4
91.69%
EnsAdv Inception ResNet v2
87.36%
Adv Inception-v3
83.73%
Ens-3-Adv Inception-v3
62.76%
Ens-4-Adv Inception-v3
58.11%
• Image augmentation is not used for targeted-attacks due to its lowering the success rate.

2.1.8

High-level Guided Denoiser (HGD) for Defense

The method proposed by Liao et al. [18] was aimed at removing the adversarial noise by training a
DNN-based denoiser. 20,000 images from ImageNet composed of 20 images for each class were
used in order to train the denoiser. FGSM and Iterative FGSM (I-FGSM) were applied to a variety
of models such as Pre-trained Inception-v3, Inception-ResNet-v2, and ResNet50-v2. Denoising UNet (DUNET) was used in order to remove adversarial perturbation with the following formulation:
dx’ = Dw (xadv ) ,
x’ = x

adv

(2.10)

- dx’ .

In the given equation 2.10, the clean image is obtained by subtracting the perturbation from the
noisy image, where Dw is a denoiser network, dx’ is estimated perturbation, and xadv is reconstructed noise-free image.
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2.2

Digital and Physical Perturbations

Digital perturbations can be classified as individually-tailored or universal. Individually-tailored
perturbations generate different perturbations for each of the input images in a dataset [6, 7, 8, 3, 19,
20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. Szegedy et al. [25] was the first to introduce individually-tailored perturbations
against deep learning networks in 2014. The adversarial images were generated using the L-BFGS
method which uses binary search to obtain an optimal input. The L-BFGS attack was an expensive
and time-consuming approach to find an adversarial input. Goodfellow et al. [10] proposed the
fast gradient sign method (FGSM). This method performed only a one-step update of the gradient.
Rozsa et al. [7] analyzed FGSM and then proposed a new approach, called fast gradient value
method. It was obtained by replacing the sign of the gradients with the raw value of the gradients.
Many recent attacks employ individually-tailored perturbations. However, universal perturbations
are easier to deploy. They are image-agnostic as they generate a single perturbation for all the
images in the dataset [26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [26] showed that universal perturbations can be generalized across different image classification models. This results in
image-agnostic and network-agnostic perturbations. The existence of such general perturbations
has been explained by considering the correlation between different image regions of the decision
boundary. Mopuri et al. [27] proposed universal perturbations which are quasi-imperceptible to
humans but capable of attacking convolutional neural networks (CNNs). This approach is able to
attack multiple images from the same target dataset across multiple deep learning networks.
Physical perturbations are generated using real-world objects such as eye glasses or printed stickers
that cause an incorrect classification in deep learning models [31, 32, 33]. Kurakin et al. [31] attacked neural networks by applying adversarial images to the physical world by extending FGSM.
They made small changes for multiple iterations and for each iteration, the pixel values were
clipped to avoid a large change on each pixel. Sharif et al. [32] presented the method of generating
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eyeglass frames, which when worn and printed can attack a state-of-the-art deep learning system
for face recognition. The perturbations generated are inconspicuous to a human and can be physically acquired via photography in the real world. Lu et al. [33] empirically showed that adversarial
perturbations can cause a deep learning network to incorrectly detect a stop sign using physical
perturbations when the captured image is taken from a specified range. However, the physical
perturbations presented in [31, 32, 33] are not naturally-occurring perturbations, and require the
participation of a malicious agent.
In addition, the latest state-of-the-art approach for fog simulation on real scenes was proposed
recently by Dai et al. [34]. They used scene semantic annotation as an additional input to their dualreference cross-bilateral filter on the Cityscapes dataset to obtain Foggy Cityscapes-DBF (Dualreference cross-Bilateral Filter). They also used a CNN-based approach to estimate fog density.
In this thesis, we propose natural attacks using visibly foggy images to generate input that causes
incorrect classification by one of the state-of-the-art image recognition networks, Inception-v3 [14].
Apart from an earlier preliminary work on attacking computer vision algorithms using fog generated via the Perlin noise on two-dimensional images [35], this is the first attempt to attack deep
learning classifiers using natural perturbations on stereo images that include depth information
and can hence be used to model realistic naturally-occurring fog. As shown in Figure 1.1 and
Figure 2.3, our approach of adding fog to images can cause deep neural networks to incorrectly
classify input images.
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(a) Image with fog incorrectly classified as aircraft by the Inception-v3 model with Ptf =0.15, Pal =0.6 and
PSNR=9.44.

(b) Image with fog incorrectly classified as scooter by the Inception-v3 model with Ptf =0.07, Pal =0.6 and
PSNR=10.77.

Figure 2.3: Images from Cityscapes dataset are incorrectly classified upon the synthetic addition of light
fog.
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(a) Image with fog incorrectly classified as submarine by the Inception-v3 model with Ptf =0.12, Pal =0.8 and
PSNR=6.74.

(b) Image with fog incorrectly classified as submarine by the Inception-v3 model with Ptf =0.12, Pal =1 and
PSNR=4.36.

Figure 2.4: Images from Cityscapes dataset are incorrectly classified upon the synthetic addition of thick
fog.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

Figure 3.1: Schematic illustration of the Inception-v3 network (Source: https://git.io/Jez0c).

3.1

Inception-v3 Model

In the last few years, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have demonstrated great success in
real world applications. Recent studies are aimed to utilize added computation in the most efficient manner using aggressive regularization and factorized convolutions to enhance networks in
different ways.
The AlexNet network by Krizhevsky et al. [36] won the ImageNet competition in 2012 and has
given successful results in a wide range of computer vision tasks such as video classification,
segmentation, and object tracking. It was composed of eight layers; convolutional layers take
place in the first five with some max-pooling layers, and the rest of the layers is fully-connected.
It utilized the non-saturating Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation function that outperformed
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over tanh and sigmoid. With the inspiration of the AlexNet contributions, the research studies
have emerged by aiming to discover new convolutional neural networks with higher quality of
performance. Within a couple of years with the use of wider and deeper networks, the quality of
network architectures significantly increased.
With the ILSVRC classification challenge in 2014, deep learning models gained higher performance due to the discovery of VGGNet [37] and GoogLeNet [38] networks. One of the advantages of VGGNet is its architectural simplicity, however, it requires a lot of computation. As
for GoogLeNet, it was crafted to excel under tough constraints on computation budget as well as
memory, however, it owns adaptation difficulties to new use-cases due to its unclear contribution
elements.
Inception-v3 [14] is one of the most widely-used image recognition architectures that has been
demonstrated to achieve greater than 78.0% accuracy on the ImageNet dataset. As in Figure 3.1,
the model is composed of convolutions, average pooling, max-pooling, concatenations, dropouts,
and fully-connected layers. The softmax activation is used for the loss function. In our experiments, we selected to use the Inception-v3 network due to its performance with high accuracy, its
feasibility in big data scenarios, and its low computational cost.

3.2

ImageNet and Cityscapes Datasets

The model we used, Inception-v3, is pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset [39] that contains 1,331,167
images. They are divided into two sets of images: One is a training set with 1,281,167 images, the
second is an evaluation set with 50,000 images. It has 1,000 different object classes such as cats,
dogs, cars, bike, traffic light, and many more.
The Cityscapes dataset [40] contains 25,000 stereo images with 30 varied visual theme categories
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such as road, sidewalk, person, rider, car, bus, building, bridge, traffic sign, and traffic light. Each
stereo image is a pair of images captured from two different cameras. These pairs of images are
denoted as left and right images.

3.3

Our Approach

We use the images obtained from the Cityscapes [40] dataset and added fog to attack the Inceptionv3 deep learning model. We use these left and right pairs of images from Cityscapes to create a
depth mapping of objects in the image. Then, we use the depth information of the objects in
the images to synthetically add fog to these images; the presence of depth information allows the
synthetically-generated fog to resemble naturally-occurring fog in the image [1].
The typical aim of an adversarial attack test is to add some natural perturbation (e.g. fog, sunlight, visual environmental changes and aberrations, etc.) over an input image in order for the deep
learning model to misclassify the image. However, it is still correctly recognized and identified
by a regular human visual-eye observer. To corroborate our claims, in this thesis we proceed to
generate a conventional, outside fog environment as a naturally-occurring, subtle climate perturbation, in order to provide this foggy image as a qualified difficult adversarial attack against the most
advanced, novel deep learning models to date including Inception-v3.
First, we run the Inception-v3 model for an autonomous driving potential application using the
weather-clear images in our dataset. Here, we seek to obtain accurate image recognition decision
results. Then, we apply generated visual fog conditions onto said baseline images from this dataset,
using specific stereo-pair images and disparity mapping techniques. Once this counterintuitive,
adversarial image is produced, Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) value disparities between our
initial weather-clear images and their corresponding foggy images are observed.
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(a) Original left image classified as traffic light by the Inception-v3 model.

(b) Original right image that forms a stereo pair along with left image.

Figure 3.2: Stereo images from the Cityscapes dataset.
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(a) Disparity image generated by the SGBM method using the left and right images. It shows the distance
of objects from the observer. Objects closer to the observer appear to be brighter and objects further away
from the observer appear to be darker.

(b) Foggy image generated by using the left and disparity images. Image with fog incorrectly classified as
scooter by the Inception-v3 model with Ptf =0.07 and Pal =0.6.

Figure 3.3: Our disparity image generated from the Cityscapes stereo images using semi-global block
matching algorithm (SGBM) and its corresponding foggy image.
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3.3.1

Semi-Global Block Matching for Depth Information

Developing dense and accurate stereo matching algorithm is challenging caused by blurry object
boundaries, occlusions, and fine structures. In order to gain better insight into the concept of stereo
matching, we can list four steps that differentiate each up-to-date stereo method: matching cost
computation, cost aggregation, disparity computation and optimization, disparity refinement. In
literature, the matching cost has been extensively computed by the difference of intensities. Mutual information for faster computation and also image gradients are used to compute matching
cost. Another bullet is cost aggregation which links the matching costs inside a certain window of
neighborhood based on patches of constant intensity. As for disparity computation, it is selected
with the lowest matching error by pixel-wise matching costs for local algorithms or chosen by
block-wise smooth disparity selection for global algorithms. Dynamic programming, graph cuts,
belief propagation, and layered methods are some of the practical frameworks that have been utilized to calculate the minimum of the global cost. Lastly, disparity refinement is usually processed
by peaks removal, consistency control, or gaps interpolation.
We used a variant of stereo processing by semi-global matching (Stereo SGM) [41] implemented in
the popular OpenCV toolkit. Instead of matching individual pixels, our algorithm matches blocks
(stereo processing by semi-global block matching) so as to calculate the depth of every pixel in
the image. This depth information generated by stereo SGBM is called the disparity of the image
and this block-wise matching is upheld by a global cost function which is actually defined as a
smoothness constraint.
Additional depth mapping information is available in the Cityscapes dataset [40] but was not precise enough to generate smooth natural fog. In order to obtain smooth disparity image, some preand post- processing filters are implemented such as weighted least squares (WLS) filter, fast bilateral solver filter (FBS), uniqueness check, and speckle filtering. Then, we use the depth value
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of each pixel to mimic realistic fog. A higher depth value indicates that the object is further away
from the observer and is less visible. An object that has a lower depth value is closer to the observer
and is not affected adversely by fog.

3.3.1.1

Matching Cost

We assume that input images have epipolar geometry and epipolar lines turn into hyperbolas by
a linear movement. However, non-linear movements turn epipolar lines into general curves and
unrectified images.
The matching cost is computed via the intensity Ibp of a pixel p of a base image and its corresponding pixel in the match image q = ebm (p,d) with the line parameter d. The epipolar line in the related
match image is defined as the function ebm (p,d).
As for block matching, the default window size of 15 is suggested to use on full-sized views.
Window size of 7 is selected on downscaled views. The views are downscaled in order to obtain faster matching process as both left and right disparity images are in need to calculate WLS
confidence map. WLS is in form of fast global smoother and uses left-right-consistency-based
confidence to improve the results in noisy regions. WLS filtering with confidence computation
provides considerably better quality results than filtering without confidence.
We used the measure of pixel dissimilarity by Birchfield and Tomasi et al. [42, 43]. So as to
compute the cost CBT (p,d), we applied the absolute minimum difference of intensities of the pixels
p and q. We also applied the default window size of 3 for stereo SGBM and force stereo matching
on full-sized views to improve the quality of images.
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3.3.1.2

Cost Aggregation

Due to the potential inaccurate matches that might have a lower cost caused by perturbations, an
additional constraint is utilized that provides smoothness. It aims to penalize neighboring disparity
changes. The energy E(D) of the disparity image D is defined for the cost calculation and the
smoothness constraints:

E(D) =

P

p

C(p, Dp ) +

P

q∈N p

Z 1 T [|Dp − Dq | = 1]+

P

q∈N p

Z 2 T [|Dp − Dq | > 1] .
(3.1)

The disparities are used to add all matching costs in the first term. All pixels q in neighborhood Np
are penalized by Z1 as disparity changes in the second term. Larger penalty is applied for larger
disparity changes in the last term. Then, aggregation (smoothness) matching costs in disparity
space is calculated by adding up the costs of all minimum cost paths that finish at desired point.

3.3.1.3

Disparity Computation and Optimization

The computation of both Db and Dm enables us to detect inaccurate matches by applying a consistency check, which ensures the uniqueness constraint. A comparison between every disparity
Db and its related Dm is performed and the disparity is assigned as invalid Dinv if they are both
different:

Dp =



 Dbp ,

if |Dbp − Dmq | ≤ 1,


 Dinv ,

otherwise.

q = ebm (p, Dbp ).
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(3.2)

(3.3)

3.3.1.4

Disparity Refinement

In order to obtain more refined disparity images, firstly a simple disparity segmentation and peak
filtering are performed for peaks removal. Then, the disparity is selected based on each constant
intensity segment in order to overcome the discontinuities within untextured areas. Lastly, different interpolations are performed separately for both the mismatches and occlusions. Mismatches
might occur as a result of incorrect smoothing of discontinuities. Therefore, an extrapolation is
the essential step for the background. However, holes that was caused by incorrect matches are
smoothly interpolated from all neighboring points.



secli v pi ,
if p is occluded,



D0 p =
medi v pi ,
if p is mismatched,




 Dp , otherwise.

(3.4)

It is ensured that the second lowest value (secli vpi ) is selected for the interpolation of occlusions
from the lower background in the first case. All information is utilized in the second case regardless
of a selection of background or foreground. Lastly, the final disparity image D’p is generated by
applying median (medi vpi ) for the irregularity removal and additional smoothness.

3.3.2

Fog Generation

Besides the depth of a pixel, our synthetically-generated fog requires two additional parameters:
the fog thickness (Ptf ) and the ambient atmospheric light (Pal ). An example of right, left, disparity
and final foggy images is shown in Figure 3.2. Disparity images are stored in such a way that
objects closer to the observer are brighter and objects further away from the observer are darker.
Examples of fog for various values of Ptf and Pal values are shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 3.4: Flowchart of the adversarial attack using our fog generator.

The thickness parameter Ptf determines the intensity of fog; a thicker fog can occlude objects that
are closer to the observer. The atmospheric light Pal parameter determines the color and intensity
of ambient light; we used white light of varying intensity for our fog. A lower value of Pal leads to
fog that is darker in color and a higher value of Pal leads to a fog that is brighter.
Steps to generate foggy images are presented in Algorithm 1. This algorithm takes a stereo image
pair as input: left image (L) and right image (R), thickness factor (Ptf ) and atmospheric light (Pal ).
First, we run Inception-v3 classifier [14] on the weather-clear images from the Cityscapes dataset [40]
and report the original label as (l). Second, the targeted foggy image (F) is initialized to left image
obtained from Cityscapes.
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Data: Left Image L, Right Image R, Thickness factor Ptf , Atmospheric Light Pal .
Result: Image F with synthetically added fog.
begin
F = L // Initialize to left image.
DN = stereoSGBM (R, L) // Calculate noisy disparity image using
stereo semi-global block matching algorithm.
D = filter (DN, R, L) // Filter noisy disparity image to generate
smooth disparity image.
for each pixel index i in F do
−Ptf

t = e D[i] // Compute transmission intensity.
F [i] = tF [i] + (1 − t)Pal
end
return F // Return foggy image.
end
Algorithm 1: Algorithm to add fog to a stereo image pair.
Using the left and right image, we find (D) as the smooth disparity image generated by the stereo
SGBM and some pre- and post- processing filters such as WLS filtering, uniqueness check, and
speckle filtering as mentioned in 3.3.1. Third, the transmission intensity is computed for each pixel
in the targeted foggy image (F) as shown in the following equation:
−Ptf

t = e D[i] .

(3.5)

In the equation 3.5, (Ptf ) refers to the fog thickness which is a combination of fog density and other
parameters. Last, the foggy image (F) keeps being generated as shown in the following equation
by iteratively updating Ptf and atmospheric light (Pal ) until our algorithm finds the lightest foggy
image that causes the Inception-v3 model [14] to misclassify the object in the image as a different
label from the original one (l):

F [i] = tF [i] + (1 − t)Pal .
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(3.6)

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS FROM IMAGES CREATED BY OUR FOG
GENERATOR

We test the robustness of the Inception-v3 deep learning classifier [14] on the synthetic images with
fog generated by our algorithm 1. In order to create fog on the images from the Cityscapes selfdriving car dataset, we use the stereo image pairs. These images are called the left and right images
which are used to create disparity map for each pair. Then, we run the classifier on the original
left image and note the classification label such as car, bike, or traffic light. Next, we create fog
on the weather-clear image using its corresponding disparity map based on our algorithm 1. We
then aim to generate the perturbed image with the lightest fog that causes a deep learning model
to misclassify the object in the image and run the classifier on the foggy image and note the new
classification label. Once the original classification label is different from the classification label
generated from the foggy image, we have exposed a potential safety error in the deep learning
classifier:

PSNR = 20 log10


D
.
RMSE

(4.1)

An ideal test of the robustness of the deep learning system will have foggy images that look similar
to the original image. We measure the similarity between the original and the foggy image using
the peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) value. PSNR value can be calculated using the equation 4.1,
where D is the maximum possible pixel value of the image and RMSE is the root mean squared
error calculated between the original and the foggy image.
High PSNR values indicate a greater similarity between the original and foggy image. In Figure 2.3, we show images with varying PSNR values. We observe that images with more visible
fog have a lower PSNR value indicating lower similarity between the original and foggy images.
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In general, fog generated with higher Ptf and Pal values have lower PSNR values. We generate
multiple foggy images by varying the values for Ptf and Pal . Then, we run the classification model
on these images and select the image with the highest PSNR value that is able to fool the deep
learning system. In Figure 2.3, Image b has the highest PSNR among all generated foggy images
that is incorrectly classified by the Inception-v3 deep learning model.
In our experiments, we aim to attack a deep learning model, Inception-v3, by adding fog using
our fog generator (Algorithm 1) on the Cityscapes dataset. Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 demonstrate
the PSNR value between an original left image and its corresponding foggy image that we find as
adversarial. First, we run the Inception-v3 model on the Cityscapes images and we classify them
based on their labels (e.g., car, traffic light, bike). Second, the algorithm runs our fog generator
to create the foggy images. The first step of the fog generation on weather-clear images is to
create the smooth disparity map using the stereo-SGBM method. This method requires to use
the left and right images; which are taken from inside a car with two cameras at different angles
targeting at the same object at the same time. Then, our synthetic foggy image is generated using
the formula in algorithm 1. Then, we report the largest PSNR value between the original left image
and foggy image that has a different label from the original one classified by Inception-v3. The
higher PSNR value, the more similar weather-clear and foggy images are; therefore, we find the
lightest fog effect on a weather-clear image that leads Inception-v3 model to misclassify the object
in the foggy image. In addition to the largest PSNR value, the model also returns the label of the
perturbed image with the corresponding Ptf and Pal values.
From our experiments, one may conclude that:

• The bounded PSNR value for the car images is found to be from 8.59 to 21.35. The adversarial foggy images of cars are observed to be classified as different labels (e.g., park bench,
parking meter, fountain, stage, bubble, washbasin).
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• The bounded PSNR value is also observed to be from 9.42 to 19.69 for the traffic light
images. The generated adversarial foggy images of traffic light have different labels such as
spotlight, wing, fountain, umbrella, locomotive and parking meter.
• The bounded PSNR value varies from 8.60 to 20.76 for the bike images. The adversarial
images of bikes are classified as lakeshore, scuba diver, aircraft carrier, bubble, fountain,
maze, spotlight, washbasin, wing, and submarine.
• Overall, we see that the decision boundary between the weather-clear images and their corresponding foggy adversarial images to vary from 8.59 to 21.35 PSNR.
• The higher PSNR value there is between a weather-clear image and foggy image, the lighter
fog effect there is on the original image.
• It may also be observed that the minimum Ptf and Pal values that result in an adversarial
foggy image are 0.07 and 0.60, respectively.
• It may also be seen that the maximum PSNR values that are found are considerably close
to each other for the same labels of adversarial images. For example, the maximum PSNR
values for almost all the adversarial images that are classified as parking meter vary from
9.24 to 12.26.
• These perturbed classes crucially affect the decision mechanism of any system that works
with deep learning classifiers.

Apart from Inception-v3, we have tested the classification results using 6 other image recognition
models on our fog images. They are Inception-ResNet-v2 [44], MobileNet [45], ResNet-50 [46],
Xception [47], VGG-16 and VGG-19 [48]. Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 demonstrate the classification
results using these deep learning models on our fog images.
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Table 4.1: The table demonstrates the performance results of the models we use and some architectural
differences among each other such as number of parameters and depth. The top-1 and top-5 accuracy results
are based on the ImageNet validation dataset. We obtain the similar outcomes such that the Xception model
is observed to be the least vulnerable among the others on our foggy images. Depth refers to the topological
depth of the network that includes some layers such as activation layers and batch normalization layers.

Model
Xception
VGG-16
VGG-19
ResNet-50
Inception-v3
Inception-ResNet-v2
MobileNet

Top-1 Accuracy
0.790
0.713
0.713
0.749
0.779
0.803
0.704

Top-5 Accuracy
0.945
0.901
0.900
0.921
0.937
0.953
0.895

Parameters
22,910,480
138,357,544
143,667,240
25,636,712
23,851,784
55,873,736
4,253,864

Depth
126
23
26
159
572
88

These synthetic foggy images are initially found as adversary by the Inception-v3 model and they
are tested by other abovementioned deep learning models afterwards. From our experiments in
the Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, we obtain the similar results as in the Table 4.1. As we report their
classified labels, we notice that some of the fog images that contain car are still classified as car
even though they are classified as different classes by Inception-v3. For instance in the Table 4.2,
the perturbed images of berlin012, 015, 027, 151, 154, 155, 183, 437 are classified as other objects
by Inception-v3, whereas they are still correctly classified as car by Xception. Another example
in the Table 4.4, the perturbed images of berlin079, 202, 206, 316, 326, 336, 384 are classified as
other objects by Inception-v3; however, they are still correctly classified as bike by Xception. We
also observe that there are some cases where the Inception-ResNet-v2 model is able to correctly
classify the object on the foggy image although the Inception-v3 model fails such as the perturbed
images of berlin094, 156 in the Table 4.3.
In conclusion, one may observe that the Xception model is more robust on foggy images compared
to the other six models we used for our experiments. From the Table 4.1, it may be observed that
Xception has similar model size with Inception-v3. However, the reason why the Xception model
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has higher accuracy than the Inception model is due to its Depthwise Separable Convolution architecture and its more efficient use of model parameters. Depthwise Separable Convolution is a
spatial convolution performed separately for every channel followed by a pointwise convolution,
which is a 1x1 convolution across channels. We may consider this as performing correlations
across 2D and then 1D space. The 2D + 1D mapping is easily learned more than a full 3D mapping and it outperforms Inception-v3 on the ImageNet and our foggy image datasets. MobileNet
has similar architecture with Xception and is optimized for mobile applications. The difference is
that MobileNet has two parameters that causes to have less number of operations. One of them
is the width multiplier which operates as the thinner of number of channels. The other one is the
resolution multiplier which is able to resize the input image. As for VGG networks, they have the
basic architecture of CNN; a number of convolutional layers, max-pooling, activation layers, and
fully-connected layers. The 16 and 19 specify the number of layers and these were considered
very deep in 2014. However, the ResNet50 model was successfully trained with 50 weight layers
in 2015. This "Residual Network" proposes learning the difference between the identity x and its
underlying mapping H(x), which is called "deep residual learning". It is observed that residual
mapping is easier to optimize than the original unreferenced mapping. We obtained different classification results on our synthetic foggy images based on all these architectural differences among
the models we used for our experiments in the Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4.
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Table 4.2: Images from Cityscapes classified as car by Inception-v3 and their corresponding foggy image we
found as adversarial. We also report the classification results of these foggy images using Inception-ResNetv2, MobileNet, ResNet-50, VGG16, VGG19, and Xception. We add fog on the original left image with the
parameters Ptf (thickness factor) and Pal (atmospheric light) to obtain an incorrect class using the model. We
also report the maximum PSNR value defined in the equation 4.1 to keep track of image similarity between
the weather-clear image and the foggy image with the lightest fog that causes Inception-v3 to misclassify.

Image

Ptf &Pal

PSNR

InceptionV3

ResNetV2

MobileNet

ResNet50

VGG16

VGG19

Xception

berlin000

0.12&1.00

10.30

park bench

traffic light

net

tripod

net

net

traffic l.

berlin009

0.10&1.00

12.26

parking meter

parking meter

car

parking meter

car

car

parking m.

berlin012

0.10&1.00

9.63

fountain

car

breakwater

net

fireboat

car

car

berlin015

0.10&0.80

15.44

bubble

bubble

net

fountain

monitor

bubble

car

berlin027

0.07&0.80

17.22

fountain

bubble

car

fountain

monitor

monitor

car

berlin070

0.07&0.80

17.93

stage

aircraft carrier

submarine

submarine

car

car

aircraft c.

berlin072

0.10&0.80

17.20

bubble

car

umbrella

tripod

wing

wing

bubble

berlin090

0.10&1.00

10.19

washbasin

dining table

net

piano

fireboat

net

net

berlin144

0.10&1.00

11.44

parking meter

parking meter

volcano

television

snowplow

fireboat

parking m.

berlin151

0.10&1.00

11.92

parking meter

parking meter

car

snowplow

snowplow

fountain

car

berlin154

0.10&0.60

21.35

spotlight

locomotive

net

bridge

wing

wing

car

berlin155

0.12&0.60

20.97

bullet

car

net

television

wing

wing

car

berlin160

0.12&0.60

19.81

spotlight

bathtub

tent

spider web

net

net

mirror

berlin164

0.15&1.00

8.59

fountain

washbasin

volcano

fountain

net

net

bubble

berlin172

0.10&1.00

9.92

mailbox

bubble

net

television

net

curtain

bubble

berlin180

0.15&1.00

8.73

ship

snowplow

net

bridge

net

curtain

bridge

berlin182

0.12&0.80

14.51

stage

bannister

stupa

television

net

net

cote

berlin183

0.15&1.00

9.12

locomotive

snowplow

projector

fireboat

monitor

fireboat

car

berlin352

0.10&1.00

12.16

spotlight

tub

net

net

net

net

volcano

berlin437

0.15&1.00

9.31

parking meter

parking meter

net

fountain

net

net

car
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(a) Weather-clear image.

(b) Smooth disparity image generated by the SGBM method.

(c) Foggy image obtained from using the weather-clear and disparity images.

Figure 4.1: An image of car with fog incorrectly classified as fountain by the Inception-v3 model with
Ptf =0.07, Pal =0.8 and PSNR=17.22.
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(a) Weather-clear image.

(b) Smooth disparity image generated by the SGBM method.

(c) Foggy image obtained from using the weather-clear and disparity images.

Figure 4.2: An image of car with fog incorrectly classified as stage by the Inception-v3 model with Ptf =0.07,
Pal =0.8 and PSNR=17.93.
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(a) Weather-clear image.

(b) Smooth disparity image generated by the SGBM method.

(c) Foggy image obtained from using the weather-clear and disparity images.

Figure 4.3: An image of car with fog incorrectly classified as spotlight by the Inception-v3 model with
Ptf =0.1, Pal =0.6 and PSNR=21.35.
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(a) Weather-clear image.

(b) Smooth disparity image generated by the SGBM method.

(c) Foggy image obtained from using the weather-clear and disparity images.

Figure 4.4: An image of car with fog incorrectly classified as locomotive by the Inception-v3 model with
Ptf =0.15, Pal =1 and PSNR=9.12.
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Table 4.3: Images from Cityscapes classified as traffic light by Inception-v3 and their corresponding foggy
image we found as adversary. We also report the classification results of these foggy images using InceptionResNet-v2, MobileNet, ResNet-50, VGG16, VGG19, and Xception. We add fog on the original left image
with the parameters Ptf (thickness factor ) and Pal (atmospheric light) to obtain incorrect class using the
model. We also report the maximum PSNR value defined in the equation 4.1 to keep track of image similarity between the weather-clear image and the foggy image with the lightest fog that causes Inception-v3
to misclassify.

Image

Ptf &Pal

PSNR

InceptionV3

ResNetV2

MobileNet

ResNet50

VGG16

VGG19

Xception

berlin014

0.10&0.80

15.41

spotlight

fire engine

net

fire engine

net

net

car

berlin016

0.10&0.80

15.29

fountain

locomotive

fireboat

television

snowplow

bubble

car

berlin032

0.10&1.00

19.69

parking meter

parking m.

car

car

car

car

car

berlin039

0.10&1.00

10.30

wing

laptop

volcano

tripod

monitor

net

bannister

berlin048

0.15&1.00

12.46

minivan

minivan

amphibian

fireboat

snowplow

fireboat

car

berlin063

0.15&1.00

17.93

spotlight

shopping cart

umbrella

missile

net

wing

spotlight

berlin094

0.10&1.00

12.58

groom

traffic light

bubble

guillotine

snowplow

missile

dumbbell

berlin123

0.10&1.00

9.66

wing

umbrella

dome

wing

net

umbrella

screen

berlin147

0.10&1.00

11.10

spotlight

door

umbrella

fountain

net

umbrella

washbasin

berlin153

0.10&1.00

9.64

vault

tractor

maze

abaya

net

umbrella

tractor

berlin156

0.10&1.00

11.92

umbrella

traffic light

wing

fountain

wing

wing

turnstile

berlin159

0.10&1.00

11.22

stage

bike

net

book jacket

monitor

door

car

berlin161

0.12&0.80

14.31

spotlight

washbasin

wing

wing

net

net

parking m.

berlin162

0.12&0.80

14.13

aircraft carrier

television

tub

television

net

umbrella

aircraft c.

berlin226

0.10&1.00

11.80

parking m.

washbasin

washbasin

curtain

monitor

safe

washbasin

berlin268

0.10&1.00

11.79

locomotive

locomotive

wing

television

fountain

fountain

locomotive

berlin298

0.10&1.00

10.54

wing

locomotive

dime

fountain

net

net

car mirror

berlin327

0.10&0.80

16.06

stage

car

fireboat

fireboat

aircraft c.

fireboat

fireboat

berlin358

0.12&1.00

10.34

fountain

bubble

vault

net

net

net

bike

berlin430

0.12&1.00

9.42

parking m.

car mirror

car

fireboat

car

car

car

berlin483

0.10&1.00

11.01

car

car

car

fire engine

car

projector

snowplow

berlin484

0.10&1.00

11.51

locomotive

locomotive

car

fountain

fountain

fountain

locomotive
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(a) Weather-clear image.

(b) Smooth disparity image generated by the SGBM method.

(c) Foggy image obtained from using the weather-clear and disparity images.

Figure 4.5: An image of traffic light with fog incorrectly classified as spotlight by the Inception-v3 model
with Ptf =0.15, Pal =1 and PSNR=17.93.
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(a) Weather-clear image.

(b) Smooth disparity image generated by the SGBM method.

(c) Foggy image obtained from using the weather-clear and disparity images.

Figure 4.6: An image of traffic light with fog incorrectly classified as spotlight by the Inception-v3 model
with Ptf =0.1, Pal =1 and PSNR=11.10.
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(a) Weather-clear image.

(b) Smooth disparity image generated by the SGBM method.

(c) Foggy image obtained from using the weather-clear and disparity images.

Figure 4.7: An image of traffic light with fog incorrectly classified as vault by the Inception-v3 model with
Ptf =0.1, Pal =1 and PSNR=9.64.
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(a) Weather-clear image.

(b) Smooth disparity image generated by the SGBM method.

(c) Foggy image obtained from using the weather-clear and disparity images.

Figure 4.8: An image of traffic light with fog incorrectly classified as parking meter by the Inception-v3
model with Ptf =0.1, Pal =1 and PSNR=11.80.
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Table 4.4: Images from Cityscapes classified as bike by Inception-v3 and their corresponding foggy image
we found as adversary. We also report the classification results of these foggy images using InceptionResNet-v2, MobileNet, ResNet-50, VGG16, VGG19, and Xception. We add fog on the original left image
with the parameters Ptf (thickness factor) and Pal (atmospheric light) to obtain incorrect class using the
model. We also report the maximum PSNR value defined in the equation 4.1 to keep track of image similarity between the weather-clear image and the foggy image with the lightest fog that causes Inception-v3
to misclassify.

Image

Ptf &Pal

PSNR

InceptionV3

ResNetV2

MobileNet

ResNet50

VGG16

VGG19

Xception

berlin079

0.15&1.00

8.60

lakeshore

bike

wing

fountain

fireboat

fireboat

bike

berlin100

0.15&1.00

9.59

scuba diver

car

amphibian

car

amphibian

amphibian

car

berlin176

0.10&0.80

15.53

submarine

bannister

umbrella

television

snowplow

fireboat

car

berlin202

0.10&1.00

11.12

chair

bike

missile

missile

net

car

bike

berlin206

0.10&0.60

18.04

aircraft carrier

breakwater

aircraft c.

wreck

airship

fireboat

bike

berlin216

0.10&1.00

9.94

scuba diver

bike

geyser

fountain

fireboat

curtain

jinrikisha

berlin300

0.10&1.00

10.26

bubble

locomotive

net

fireboat

net

net

car

berlin302

0.15&1.00

9.80

spark bench

spotlight

dome

tripod

net

net

car

berlin303

0.15&1.00

9.53

wing

bannister

wing

wing

wing

volcano

car

berlin306

0.10&1.00

11.16

bubble

bubble

net

television

net

curtain

parking m.

berlin316

0.15&1.00

9.85

aircraft carrier

traffic light

wing

platform

monitor

wing

bike

berlin326

0.10&0.80

15.41

fountain

tank

aircraft c.

submarine

fireboat

submarine

bike

berlin336

0.12&1.00

11.08

maze

bike

bike

bike

traffic light

missile

bike

berlin359

0.10&1.00

11.43

parking meter

bubble

vault

abaya

net

curtain

parking m.

berlin367

0.10&0.80

16.55

fountain

car

volcano

television

snowplow

fireboat

car

berlin384

0.12&0.80

15.59

spotlight

bike

bike

curtain

net

fountain

bike

berlin404

0.15&1.00

9.24

parking meter

car mirror

warplane

fireboat

fireboat

fireboat

car

berlin408

0.12&0.60

20.76

aircraft carrier

bike

wing

fountain

wing

wing

traffic light

berlin412

0.12&0.60

20.73

bubble

bubble

fire engine

curtain

snowplow

snowplow

car

berlin417

0.15&1.00

9.85

washbasin

snowplow

curtain

fountain

. curtain

curtain

triumphal arch
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(a) Weather-clear image.

(b) Smooth disparity image generated by the SGBM method.

(c) Foggy image obtained from using the weather-clear and disparity images.

Figure 4.9: An image of bike with fog incorrectly classified as submarine by the Inception-v3 model with
Ptf =0.1, Pal =0.8 and PSNR=15.53.
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(a) Weather-clear image.

(b) Smooth disparity image generated by the SGBM method.

(c) Foggy image obtained from using the weather-clear and disparity images.

Figure 4.10: An image of bike with fog incorrectly classified as scuba diver by the Inception-v3 model with
Ptf =0.1, Pal =1 and PSNR=9.94.
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(a) Weather-clear image.

(b) Smooth disparity image generated by the SGBM method.

(c) Foggy image obtained from using the weather-clear and disparity images.

Figure 4.11: An image of bike with fog incorrectly classified as parking meter by the Inception-v3 model
with Ptf =0.1, Pal =1 and PSNR=11.43.
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(a) Weather-clear image.

(b) Smooth disparity image generated by the SGBM method.

(c) Foggy image obtained from using the weather-clear and disparity images.

Figure 4.12: An image of bike with fog incorrectly classified as fountain by the Inception-v3 model with
Ptf =0.1, Pal =0.8 and PSNR=16.55.
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CHAPTER 5: IMPACT OF REAL FOG ON DEEP LEARNING SYSTEM

(a) Car misclassified as aircraft.

(b) Car misclassified as aircraft.

(c) Traffic light misclassified as fountain.

(d) Car misclassified as geyser.

Figure 5.1: Classification results obtained by Inception-v3 on real fog images of a traffic light and car.

In addition to doing analysis using our synthetically generated foggy images on the robustness
of Inception-v3, one of the state-of-the-art deep learning classifiers, we also tested it with real
foggy images. Our experiments demonstrate that the distance of the object from the camera has
a significant effect on the classification result with the naturally-occurring fog in the images 5.7.
Furthermore, traffic light is the subject that is correctly classified with most of the real fog cases
as in the figure 5.8. We also see some rare cases where the first and third images are correctly
classified whereas the second one is misclassified as in the figure 5.5.

52

(a) Real fog image-1 incorrectly classified as monitor by Inception-v3.

(b) Real fog image-2 incorrectly classified as church by Inception-v3.

(c) Real fog image-3 incorrectly classified as fountain by Inception-v3.

Figure 5.2: Real fog experiment - 1: Classification results of 3 consecutive frames that contain a car with
real fog.
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(a) Real fog image-1 incorrectly classified as aircraft by Inception-v3.

(b) Real fog image-2 incorrectly classified as aircraft by Inception-v3.

(c) Real fog image-3 correctly classified as car by Inception-v3.

Figure 5.3: Real fog experiment - 2: Classification results of 3 consecutive frames that contain a car with
real fog. The third image is relatively closer than the other first two images and Inception-v3 returns the
correct label as car.
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(a) Real fog image-1 incorrectly classified as swing by Inception-v3.

(b) Real fog image-2 incorrectly classified as aircraft by Inception-v3.

(c) Real fog image-3 correctly classified as traffic light by Inception-v3.

Figure 5.4: Real fog experiment - 3: Classification results of 3 consecutive frames that contain a traffic light
with real fog. The third image is relatively closer than the other first two images and Inception-v3 returns
the correct label as traffic light.
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(a) Real fog image-1 correctly classified as traffic light by Inception-v3.

(b) Real fog image-2 incorrectly classified as aircraft by Inception-v3.

(c) Real fog image-3 correctly classified as traffic light by Inception-v3.

Figure 5.5: Real fog experiment - 4: Classification results of 3 consecutive frames that contain a traffic light
with real fog. Only the second image is misclassified as aircraft.
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(a) Real fog image-1 correctly classified as traffic light by Inception-v3.

(b) Real fog image-2 correctly classified as traffic light by Inception-v3.

(c) Real fog image-3 correctly classified as traffic light by Inception-v3.

Figure 5.6: Real fog experiment - 5: Classification results of 3 consecutive frames that contain a traffic light
with real fog. They are all classified as traffic light by Inception-v3.
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(a) Real fog image-1 incorrectly classified as tripod by Inception-v3.

(b) Real fog image-2 correctly classified as traffic light by Inception-v3.

(c) Real fog image-3 correctly classified as traffic light by Inception-v3.

Figure 5.7: Real fog experiment - 6: Classification results of 3 consecutive frames that contain a traffic light
with real fog. The first one (the farthest one from the camera) is classified as tripod.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

Figure 5.8: Real fog experiment - 7: They are all correctly classified as traffic light by Inception-v3. a, c, e,
g are four consecutive frames. b, d, f, h are another four consecutive frames.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The overall goal of this thesis was to do analysis on accuracy results and robustness of deep learning models. To achieve this goal, we propose to perturb images naturally and then test deep learning
models with them. We introduce natural attacks caused by our synthetically-generated fog added
on the images from the Cityscapes self-driving car dataset. Our approach uses computer graphics
techniques such as stereo semi-global block matching (stereo SGBM) algorithm, in order to create
disparity map using the left and right image from Cityscapes. They are called as stereo images
which is a pair of images captured from two different cameras. It also uses weighted least squares
(WLS) post-filtering for smoother disparity map and the results of this post-processing provided
us with significantly better quality of depth images. Next, our algorithm generates fog effect by
determining the density of fog with two parameters: thickness factor and atmospheric light. It
increases the density by incrementing the parameter values to find the image with the lightest fog
that causes the deep learning network to misclassify the outdoor object in the image.
We observed that these images with synthetically-generated fog were able to fool one of the current
state-of-the-art deep learning systems, Inception-v3. Our synthetic foggy images were also tested
by other most well-known deep learning models. From our experiments, our dataset with synthetic
foggy images were observed to obtain the similar accuracy results with the ImageNet dataset on the
7 models we used; Inception-v3, Inception-ResNet-v2, MobileNet, ResNet-50, Xception, VGG16, and VGG-19. For instance, the Xception model is more robust on our synthetic foggy images
compared to the other six models we used for our experiments. As we reported the classified labels,
we noticed that some of the fog images that contain car are still classified as car by Xception even
though they are classified as different classes by Inception-v3. It is known that Xception has
similar model size with Inception-v3. However, the reason why the Xception model has higher
accuracy than the Inception model is due to its Depthwise Separable Convolution architecture and
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its more efficient use of model parameters. MobileNet has similar architecture with Xception and
is optimized for mobile applications. The difference is that MobileNet has two parameters that
causes to have less number of operations: the width multiplier and the resolution multiplier. As
for VGG networks, they have the basic architecture of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs); a
number of convolutional layers, max-pooling, activation layers, and fully-connected layers. The
16 and 19 specify the number of layers and these were considered very deep in 2014. However, the
ResNet50 model was successfully trained with 50 weight layers in 2015. This "Residual Network"
proposes learning the difference between the identity x and its underlying mapping H(x), which
is called "deep residual learning". It is observed that residual mapping is easier to optimize than
the original unreferenced mapping. We see different classification results on our synthetic foggy
images based on all these architectural differences among the models we use for our experiments.
We also tested Inception-v3 on real fog images to compare the results with the ones we obtained
from our synthetic fog images. We observed the model returns similar results of misclassification
for the real fog images. Hence, existing deep learning systems are vulnerable not only to digital
and physical adversarial attacks, but they produce incorrect answers even when faced with benign
natural perturbations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on attacking deep learning
classifiers with naturally perturbed images obtained from stereo dataset and depth information.
Several interesting directions for future work remain open. First, we want to explore the effects of
other naturally occurring conditions such as rain, hail and snow not only on the deep learning image
classification systems, but also on the DL models for image segmentation. Second, we will test the
robustness of systems designed specifically for outdoor functionality such as autonomous driving
systems. Adversarial learning has been playing important role in improving the performance of
DL models; therefore, we aim at training or re-training models with the synthetic perturbed images
found as adversary. Third, we will explore the design of defense algorithms that can permit deep
neural networks to reason correctly about images with fog and other natural perturbations.
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